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CC trojan-setup

自动安装和配置 Trojan 代理客户端，支持 proxychains4 全局代理，修复 Chrome 官方源。适用于 Linux 系统的翻墙环境搭建。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: salebender249-del v1.0.0 MIT-0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 704 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureGitHubInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
74/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
77
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 7
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege README.md:136
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo rm -rf /usr/src/trojan
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege README.md:137
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo rm -f /etc/systemd/system/trojan.service
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:192
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo rm -rf /usr/src/trojan
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:193
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo rm -f /etc/systemd/system/trojan.service
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process install.sh:103
    Starts a background / autostarted process (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "   sudo systemctl enable trojan"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process README.md:63
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable trojan  # 开机自启
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:74
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable trojan  # 开机自启

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 21 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 704 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 76: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 21 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This looks like a real Trojan proxy setup skill, but it needs Review because it asks for root access and makes broad system, network, and package-source changes with unsafe defaults.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026