AC golang-security
Security best practices and vulnerability prevention for Golang. Covers injection (SQL, command, XSS), cryptography, filesystem safety, network security, cookies, secrets management, memory safety, and logging. Apply when writing, reviewing, or auditing Go code for security, or when working on any risky code involving crypto, I/O, secrets management, user input handling, or authentication. Includes configuration of security tools.
As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
-
medium Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenreferences/secrets.md:26Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)APIKey: "abc1…key", // DON'T
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low Secrets in code
secret-aws-keyreferences/secrets.md:19AWS access key ID (placeholder value)AWS_ACCESS_KEY = "AKIA…PLE" // DON'T
placeholder -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalreferences/secrets.md:26Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)APIKey: "abc1…key", // DON'T
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:54Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)3. **What is the blast radius?** — If this defense fails, what's the worst outcome? (Data leak, RCE, privilege escalation, denial of service)
quoted
Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "paths"
Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 27 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3186 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 434: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 16 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 27 items
- +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (12 of 12)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.