SKILLEMALL.ai

AD aegis-audit

Deep behavioral security audit for AI agent skills and MCP tools. Performs deterministic static analysis (AST + Semgrep + 15 specialized scanners), cryptographic lockfile generation, and optional LLM-powered intent analysis. Use when installing, reviewing, or approving any skill, tool, plugin, or MCP server — especially before first use. Replaces basic safety summaries with full CWE-mapped, OWASP-tagged, line-referenced security reports.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: sanguineseal v0.1.10 4 files body ≈ 2 358 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerGitHubAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:168
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Dockerfile Analyzer | Privilege escalation, secrets in ENV/ARG, unpinned images |
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:173
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      | Combo Analyzer | Multi-capability attack chains (exfiltration, C2, ransomware) |

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "url"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 20 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2358 tokens
    • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 441: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
    • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    Aegis Audit appears to be a disclosed security-auditing skill; its main risk is an optional LLM mode that can send scanned code to third-party providers if the user enables it.
    LLM: benign (medium) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026