SKILLEMALL.ai

CD jep-guard

Configure or inspect a local execution policy gate when the user requests JEP Guard protection.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: JEP (Judgment Event Protocol) v3.0.0 MIT-0 80 files · 72 scripts body ≈ 190 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 9 d ago

Configure or inspect a local execution policy gate when the user requests JEP Guard protection.

As a process D 42/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: steps, result and completion, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
42/100
Unfinished process
Steps w 15
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:115
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…6ZJ+KBBf…ynt+Aj0x…71g==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:194
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…55h/ff8EMaJ+cYhy…4pW+sXf9…fFg==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:315
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha512-Yqfm+XDx0+Prh3…1yC+JWZ2…IL7+vK+Clp7…D7g==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:328
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…xZl+RoGR…fbT/ZgrF…0EA==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:357
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "integrity": "sha5…H47+FFon…OsV/4+RRsz…0ig==",
      quoted

    Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 42/100

    • 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 190 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 95: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +4Structure: 0 headings, hard to scan
    • +3No numbered steps or checklist
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This skill is a disclosed local execution gate that can block and audit integrated actions only when the operator explicitly enables full mode.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 17 Sept 2026