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BC alibabacloud-agent-toolkit-install

Install Alibaba Cloud Agent Toolkit end-to-end: verify and set up prerequisites (uv, Alibaba Cloud CLI, authentication, CLI plugins, MCP Server Core, bearer token exchange), then install the toolkit via the current client's supported plugin mechanism. Use when: alibabacloud agent toolkit install, environment check, prerequisite check, setup alibabacloud, plugin install, toolkit setup, mcp core setup, aliyun CLI setup.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: alibabacloud-skills-team v0.0.2 MIT-0 5 files · 1 script body ≈ 4 370 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

Install Alibaba Cloud Agent Toolkit end-to-end: verify and set up prerequisites (uv, Alibaba Cloud CLI, authentication, CLI plugins, MCP Server Core, bearer…

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, progress reporting

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass SKILL.md:133
      Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
      powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\inst…ps1
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:90
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation table row)
      | macOS / Linux   | `curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh \| sh` |
      table
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass SKILL.md:91
      Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (documentation table row)
      | Windows (PowerShell) | `powershell -ExecutionPolicy ByPass -c "irm https://astral.sh/uv/install.ps1 \| iex"` |
      table

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4370 tokens
    • 85Steps. 47 steps, 2 vague phrases
    • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 421: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 33 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 47 items
    • +4Has examples (19 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This installer is clearly for Alibaba Cloud setup, but it asks users to install persistent tools and agent plugins from unpinned remote sources that can change after review.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 11 Sept 2026