BF alibabacloud-ak-leak-incident-response
Investigate an Alibaba Cloud AccessKey (AK) leakage incident and produce a read-only investigation report. Use when the user reports a leaked / exposed / stolen / compromised Alibaba Cloud AccessKey (AK / AK-SK / access key / secret key / RAM credential); receives an AK-leak alert, risk notification, SMS, or email; finds an AK/secret exposed on GitHub, Gitee, a public repo, logs, or config files; needs AK-leak incident response, post-theft investigation, or risk assessment; or wants to trace a leaked AK's malicious operations, attack chain, created sub-users (RAM users), or new AccessKeys.
Investigate an Alibaba Cloud AccessKey (AK) leakage incident and produce a read-only investigation report.
As a process F 56/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: scripts/query_*.py
How to improve
- The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 5
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/module3_actiontrail_audit.md:164Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| `Ram` | Sub-account creation, privilege escalation | ALL/AK/IP/Service |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/module3_actiontrail_audit.md:183Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)| **HIGH** | `CreateUser`, `CreateAccessKey`, `AttachPolicyToUser`, `RunInstances`, `CreateInstance`, `SendSms`, `AddDomainRecord` | Account creation, privilege escalation, resource provisioning |
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/module4_timeline_report.md:124Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Privilege escalation | HIGH | Admin policies attached to rogue sub-accounts |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/module5_remediation_best_practices.md:43Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)**Why**: Attacker-created ECS instances may be used for cryptocurrency mining, C2 relay, DDoS, or lateral movement. Each minute of operation incurs billing and increases liability.
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityreferences/module5_remediation_best_practices.md:188Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Sub-user creation + privilege escalation | Delete sub-users + their AKs + policies | Rotate all account AKs | Enable MFA, audit all RAM policies |
Files scanned: 18. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
missing-refreference to a missing file: scripts/query_*.py
Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100
- 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: scripts/query_*.py
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 11 mutating operations with no state check
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 10 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2664 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval
- low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -33 of 6 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 596: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (7 of 9)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.