BC alibabacloud-cas-ssl-cert-deploy
Deploy SSL certificates to Alibaba Cloud products (CDN/SLB/WAF/ALB/NLB/OSS/ESA, etc.). One-click or batch deployment via CAS DeploymentJob API, with progress tracking, failure diagnosis, rollback, and HTTPS verification. Activate when user says "deploy certificate to CDN", "deploy to SLB", "one-click deploy certificate", "push certificate to cloud", "部署证书到 CDN", "部署到 SLB", "一键部署证书", "证书推送到云产品".
Deploy SSL certificates to Alibaba Cloud products (CDN/SLB/WAF/ALB/NLB/OSS/ESA, etc.). One-click or batch deployment via CAS DeploymentJob API, with progress…
As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, execution cost
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/cli-installation-guide.md:42Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/cli-installation-guide.md:48Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 10291 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 142 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 10291 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Steps. 30 steps, 4 vague phrases
- 100Failures and branches. 7 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -233 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 8 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 397: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 40 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
- +4Has examples (17 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (8 of 8)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.