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BB alibabacloud-cli-guidance

Guide users to manage Alibaba Cloud resources using the Aliyun CLI command-line tool. Covers CLI installation, credential configuration, plugin management, command construction, and error troubleshooting. Use this skill when the user wants to operate Alibaba Cloud services from the terminal — including ECS (云服务器, cloud servers), Function Compute (函数计算, serverless), RDS (云数据库, databases), OSS (对象存储, object storage), SLS (日志服务, log service), VPC (专有网络, networking), ESS (弹性伸缩, auto scaling), and any other Alibaba Cloud product. Also use when the user mentions "aliyun", "阿里云", "阿里云CLI", "命令行", asks about CLI plugin installation, encounters Aliyun CLI errors (InvalidAccessKeyId, SignatureDoesNotMatch, Throttling), or needs help constructing aliyun commands with correct parameter syntax.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: alibabacloud-skills-team v0.0.2 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 5 466 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 76/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
76/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Result and completion w 14
60
When it triggers w 12
70
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/installation-guide.md:37
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/installation-guide.md:43
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash aliyun cli
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:68
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    **Pre-check: Aliyun CLI >= 3.3.3 required** — Run `aliyun version`. If too low: `curl -fsSL https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/setup.sh | bash` or see `references/installation-guide.md`.
    quoted

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5466 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 76/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5466 tokens
  • 85Steps. 21 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (6 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 2 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 792: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 30 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (32 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a coherent Alibaba Cloud CLI guidance skill with expected cloud-credential and installer risks that users should handle carefully.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026