SKILLEMALL.ai

BB alibabacloud-cloudfw-vpc-firewall-diagnosis

Diagnose Alibaba Cloud Cloud Firewall VPC firewall provisioning failures, route policy configuration failures, and closure pre-check risks using read-only CloudFirewall, CBN, VPC, STS, and ActionTrail APIs. Use this skill when troubleshooting VPC firewall creation failures, route policy/drainage configuration failures, firewall status stuck in configuring, or assessing route and ACL impact before closing VPC firewall drainage.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: alibabacloud-skills-team v0.0.1 MIT-0 17 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 619 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

Diagnose Alibaba Cloud Cloud Firewall VPC firewall provisioning failures, route policy configuration failures, and closure pre-check risks using read-only…

As a process B 75/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: running it twice, progress reporting

AnalyzerAI and agentsSoftware developmentData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
75/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Bash
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/api_reference.md:26
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
      | `Crea…icy` | `--FirewallId`, `--RegionId`, `--PolicyType`, `--SrcCandidateList` | `--PolicyName`, `--PolicyDescription` | Create new drainage strategy |
      table
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/api_reference.md:27
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
      | `Modi…ope` | `--FirewallId`, `--RegionId`, `--TrFirewallRoutePolicyId`, `--SrcCandidateList` | `--PolicyName`, `--PolicyDescription`, `--delCandidateList` | Add/modify netw
      table
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/api_reference.md:28
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)
      | `Desc…ist` | `--FirewallId`, `--RegionId` | - | Get TR firewall route policy list |
      table
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/cli_commands.md:112
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      --Lo…lue Crea…icy \
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/diagnosis_steps.md:75
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      --Lo…lue Crea…icy \
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/diagnosis_steps.md:88
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      --Lo…lue Modi…ope \
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/firewall_lifecycle.md:68
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      --Lo…lue Crea…icy \

    Files scanned: 17. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 75/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 55 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2619 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -31 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 430: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 26 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 55 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (8 of 12)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    The skill is a disclosed read-only Alibaba Cloud firewall diagnostic helper, with no artifact-backed evidence of hidden writes, exfiltration, or destructive behavior.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 25 Jun 2026