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BB alibabacloud-csas-user-device-ops

Use this skill when users ask about SASE terminal device management, user account queries, inactive device analysis, or device locking on Alibaba Cloud SASE (product code: csas). Trigger scenarios: "查下哪些设备长期离线", "某部门有多少 终端设备", "锁定闲置设备", "查看用户被授权了哪些应用". Capabilities: flexible device querying with 20+ filters (department, device type, OS, SASE feature status, etc.), user listing, user application authorization queries, inactive device analysis, and locking inactive devices. Deletion or irreversible operations are NOT supported — users are guided to the SASE console. 当用户询问 SASE 终端设备管理、用户账号查询、非活跃设备分析、设备锁定时使用此 Skill。 支持灵活的设备条件组合查询（20+ 筛选项）、用户列表查询、应用授权查询、非活跃设备分析、 锁定非活跃终端。不支持删除等不可逆操作。 注意：当前不支持用户活跃度分析（API 不提供用户最后活跃时间，设备绑定关系会变更）。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: alibabacloud-skills-team v0.0.1 MIT-0 11 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 4 472 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Trigger scenarios: "查下哪些设备长期离线", "某部门有多少 终端设备", "锁定闲置设备", "查看用户被授权了哪些应用".

As a process B 75/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationSoftware developmentData and analyticsAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
100
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
75/100
Nearly there
When it triggers w 12
20
Inputs and preconditions w 11
30
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:30
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:45
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:58
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:71
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Bash Read

    Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 75/100

    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4472 tokens
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 60 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (7 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 730: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 20 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 60 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 5)
    • +3All 4 scripts are documented
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 100.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill is not obviously malicious, but it requests sensitive Alibaba Cloud authority and includes broader device-state and CLI setup powers than its inactive-device workflow clearly needs.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 1 Jun 2026