SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

DB alibabacloud-dataworks-infra-manage

DataWorks Infrastructure Management: Create and query operations for Data Sources (50 types), Compute Resources, and Serverless Resource Groups, plus connectivity testing and resource group binding/unbinding. Uses aliyun CLI to call dataworks-public OpenAPI (2024-05-18). Trigger keywords: DataWorks data source, compute resource, resource group, datasource, data source, compute resource, resource group, mysql/hologres/maxcompute data source, holo/mc/flink resource, Serverless resource group, DataWorks infra, create/list datasource, DW environment config, infrastructure initialization, connect database to DataWorks, database connection failure, configure holo/mc resource. Not triggered: data development tasks, scheduling configuration, MaxCompute table management, data integration tasks, ECS/RDS/OSS operations, workspace member management, data quality monitoring, data lineage, data preview.

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: alibabacloud-skills-team v0.0.3 MIT-0 59 files body ≈ 4 970 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting

IntegrationMySQLInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
52/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
30
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 14

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 14
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:20
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:29
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/data-sources/hive.md:30
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `keystorePassword` | String | `apasara` | No | Keystore password |
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/data-sources/hive.md:57
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `keystorePassword` | String | `apasara` | No | Keystore password |
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/data-sources/hive.md:86
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `keystorePassword` | String | `apasara` | No | Keystore password |
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/data-sources/hive.md:109
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `keystorePassword` | String | `apasara` | No | Keystore password |
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/data-sources/kafka.md:23
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `keystorePassword` | String | `xxx` | No | Keystore password. |
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/data-sources/mysql.md:25
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `keystorePassword` | String | `apasara` | No | Keystore password. |
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/data-sources/mysql.md:63
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `keystorePassword` | String | `apasara` | No | Keystore password. |
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/data-sources/mysql.md:99
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `keystorePassword` | String | `apasara` | No | Keystore password. |
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/data-sources/polardb.md:23
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `keystorePassword` | String | No | Keystore password |
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/data-sources/redis.md:21
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `keystorePassword` | String | `xxx` | No | Keystore password. |
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/data-sources/redis.md:36
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `keystorePassword` | String | `xxx` | No | Keystore password. |
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/data-sources/tidb.md:24
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      | `keystorePassword` | String | `apasara` | No | Keystore password |

    Files scanned: 59. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 36 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4970 tokens
    • 100Steps. 30 steps
    • 100Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 26 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 902: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 40 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
    • +4Has examples (17 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This appears to be a real DataWorks management skill, but it needs review because its documentation includes broader cloud, billing, credential, and workspace-member authority than its stated scope requires.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026