CB alibabacloud-dataworks-workspace-manage
DataWorks Workspace Lifecycle Management Skill. Used for creating workspaces, querying workspace information, and adding workspace members with role authorization. Triggers: "DataWorks", "workspace management", "workspace", "member authorization", "role assignment"
As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:73Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)curl -fsSL --max-time 30 https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/install.sh | bash
Medium and low: 4
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/cli-installation-guide.md:30Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/cli-installation-guide.md:45Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/cli-installation-guide.md:58Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegereferences/cli-installation-guide.md:71Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100
- 30Running it twice. 17 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 22 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3901 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 265: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 38 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
- +4Has examples (16 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (6 of 6)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.