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BC alibabacloud-ddos-origin-exposure-detector

Alibaba Cloud Anti-DDoS Proxy (ddoscoo) origin-server IP exposure risk detector. Detects whether a website protected by Anti-DDoS Proxy still has its origin IP exposed to direct attack, across two scenarios: (S1) a protected domain whose public DNS still resolves to the origin IP, bypassing protection; (S2) the origin IP is directly reachable from the public Internet. Reads protected domains / CNAME / origin IPs via ddoscoo (DescribeWebRules / DescribeNetworkRules). Two probe methods: (1) cloud probe via Cms one-off site monitor (CreateInstantSiteMonitor + DescribeSiteMonitorLog); (2) local dig / curl / nc, used when cloud probe is unavailable. Binary verdict. Triggers: "源站IP暴露", "源站暴露检测", "高防被绕过", "流量绕过高防", "origin IP exposure", "DDoS origin detection", "ddos-origin-exposure", "检测源站", "探测源站", "网络分析与监控探测源站", "Call DescribeWebRules", "DescribeWebRules", "DescribeNetworkRules", "CreateInstantSiteMonitor", "DescribeSiteMonitorLog", "get protected domains", "probe origin server", "site monitor probe origin".

ClawHub Agent Skills author: alibabacloud-skills-team v0.0.1 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 16 091 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

Alibaba Cloud Anti-DDoS Proxy (ddoscoo) origin-server IP exposure risk detector.

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, execution cost, running it twice

AnalyzerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Execution cost w 6
10
Running it twice w 4
30
Result and completion w 14
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:30
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:45
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:58
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:71
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 16091 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 10Execution cost. Instruction body is 16091 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 30Running it twice. 33 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Steps. 50 steps, 4 vague phrases
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Failures and branches. 7 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (17 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 1019: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 15 example trigger phrases
  • +4Structure: 18 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 50 items
  • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill has a coherent security-scanning purpose, but it also asks the agent to modify the local Aliyun CLI/plugin setup and includes risky credential/setup guidance that deserves manual review before installation.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 25 Aug 2026