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CC alibabacloud-emas-apm-remotelog

EMAS APM Remote Log (TLog) CLI Skill. Use for remote log retrieval, task management, and log query operations via Alibaba Cloud CLI. Triggers: "EMAS APM", "remote log", "tlog", "log retrieval", "log collection", "get-tlog-device-list", "create-tlog-task", "search-tlog", "mobile app log".

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: alibabacloud-skills-team v0.0.1 MIT-0 7 files body ≈ 4 553 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

EMAS APM Remote Log (TLog) CLI Skill.

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
71/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
56
Quality 40%
93
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Result and completion w 14
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:34
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 120 https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/setup.sh | bash
Medium and low: 6
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/cli-installation-guide.md:15
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation table row)
    | **Remote script piped to shell** (`curl … \| bash`) | SKILL.md Installation section | Use the [Safer installation flow](#safer-installation-flow) below — download, inspect, then execute. |
    table
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:66
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:81
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:94
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:107
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:16
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation table row)
    | **Privilege elevation via `sudo mv … /usr/local/bin/`** | macOS / Debian / Ubuntu / CentOS / RHEL / ARM64 binary install | Only run `sudo` after verifying the downloaded archive's source (HTTPS host
    table

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 23 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4553 tokens
  • 85Steps. 29 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 8 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 288: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 21 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 29 items
  • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 93.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
The skill is a disclosed Alibaba Cloud EMAS remote-log helper with sensitive but purpose-aligned cloud log access and no evidence of hidden exfiltration or destructive behavior.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 9 Jul 2026