SKILLEMALL.ai

BB alibabacloud-migration-dbm-redis-shake-migration

端到端管理 RedisShake 数据迁移任务:从用户提供的 Excel 表格、文本描述或逐项问答中提取迁移信息,生成 shake.toml 配置文件,并在本地或通过 SSH 远程部署、启动、停止、监控迁移任务。当用户需要配置 Redis 迁移/同步、提供了含 Redis 地址密码等信息的文本/表格、需要启动或管理 RedisShake 任务、或通过 SSH 远程操作服务器时触发。本 skill 不适用于:MongoDB/MySQL/ES 等非 Redis 数据迁移、Redis 内存 dump 备份、集群拓扑改造、未提供 SSH 凭证的远程操作;本 skill 不验证迁移后的数据一致性(推荐使用redis-full-check进行校验),仅在已部署 redis-shake 二进制的 Linux 服务器上运行。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: alibabacloud-skills-team v0.0.1 MIT-0 9 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 4 459 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

端到端管理 RedisShake 数据迁移任务:从用户提供的 Excel 表格、文本描述或逐项问答中提取迁移信息,生成 shake.toml 配置文件,并在本地或通过 SSH 远程部署、启动、停止、监控迁移任务。当用户需要配置 Redis 迁移/同步、提供了含 Redis 地址密码等信息的文本/表格、需要启动或管理…

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, running it twice

ProcedureMySQLMongoDBInfrastructureData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 8
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:338
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo bash -c 'cat > /etc/systemd/system/redis-shake.service << "EOF"
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/remote-ssh.md:91
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    ssh -o ConnectTimeout=10 -o ServerAliveInterval=30 -t USER@HOST 'sudo tee /etc/systemd/system/redis-shake.service > /dev/null << "EOF"
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/remote-ssh.md:110
    Starts a background / autostarted process (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    ssh -o ConnectTimeout=10 -o ServerAliveInterval=30 -t USER@HOST 'sudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl enable redis-shake && sudo systemctl start redis-shake && sudo systemctl status redis-sh
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/start.sh:21
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup ./redis-shake shake.toml > data/shake.log 2>&1 &
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:301
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup ./redis-shake shake.toml > data/shake.log 2>&1 &
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:353
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl enable redis-shake && sudo systemctl start redis-shake
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:421
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup ./redis-shake task1.toml > data/task1/shake.log 2>&1 &
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:422
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup ./redis-shake task2.toml > data/task2/shake.log 2>&1 &

Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4459 tokens
  • 85Steps. 68 steps, 3 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 359: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 44 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 68 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (19 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
  • +3All 4 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This Redis migration skill is purpose-built, but it should be reviewed carefully because it gives an agent sensitive SSH, Redis credential, remote command, sudo, and persistence capabilities with some incomplete safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 1 Sept 2026