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BC alibabacloud-network-alb-http-to-https

Configure HTTP-to-HTTPS redirects on Alibaba Cloud ALB, including inspecting the current listener and rule setup, creating missing HTTP or HTTPS listeners, and adding a redirect rule that forces HTTP requests to HTTPS. Use this skill when a user wants to enable HTTPS enforcement on an existing ALB, redirect port 80 traffic to 443, or check whether an ALB already has a correct HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect configuration.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: alibabacloud-skills-team v0.0.1-beta.2 MIT-0 16 files · 12 scripts body ≈ 3 474 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
75
Quality 40%
92
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:24
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:35
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:44
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Bash Read
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:34
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      > run `curl -fsSL https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/setup.sh | bash` to update,
      quoted

    Files scanned: 16. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 31 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 5 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3474 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 416: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 11 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 31 items
    • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
    • +3All 12 scripts are documented
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 92.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill mostly does disclosed Alibaba Cloud ALB HTTPS-redirect work, but it also exposes broader traffic-rule actions that can reroute or block live service traffic.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026