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阿里云 PDS（智能云盘/网盘）文件操作技能。支持：文件搜索、上传、下载、重命名、移动、复制、创建文件夹、标签/备注、分享链接、文档/音视频分析、打包下载、图像编辑、以图搜图和 PDS 挂载盘（mountapp，将云盘挂载为本地磁盘）的安装与挂载。 当用户要操作其 PDS、网盘、云盘中的文件或空间时（包括仅说明重命名/移动/复制等操作的安全处理方式，不要求真实执行），或要把云盘挂载到本地像本地文件一样访问时，应使用此 skill。即使用户只是简单说"帮我从PDS下载"、"上传到网盘"、"把报告.pdf重命名"、"PDS里有什么文件"、"把文件打包下载"、"分析下这个文档"、"把云盘挂载到本地"、"安装挂载盘"，也应触发。 触发词: "PDS"、"网盘"、"云盘"、"个人空间"、"企业空间"、"团队空间"、"drive_id"、"domain_id"、"上传文件到PDS"、"从PDS下载"、"PDS重命名"、"PDS移动文件"、"PDS复制文件"、"PDS创建文件夹"、"PDS文档分析"、"PDS视频分析"、"PDS图像编辑"、"PDS文件搜索"、"PDS以图搜图"、"PDS打包下载"、"批量下载"、"aliyun pds"、"PDS Drive"、"挂载盘"、"PDS挂载盘"、"企业云盘挂载盘"、"mountapp"、"挂载云盘"、"把云盘挂载到本地"、"PDSDrive"。 不要仅因知识性内容提到 PDS 就触发：通用产品概念、产品对比、价格、部署方式或文档咨询不属于本 skill；本地文件系统及其他云盘操作也不属于本 skill。 Use this skill for operations on the user's PDS files or spaces, and for installing/mounting the PDS mount app (mountapp) to access the cloud drive as a local disk. Do not trigger for generic PDS product concepts, comparisons, pricing, deployment, or documentation questions.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: alibabacloud-skills-team v0.0.7 MIT-0 17 files body ≈ 7 478 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion

ProcedureInfrastructureWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
32/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
50
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/mountapp.md:354
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    Register-ScheduledTask `
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/mountapp.md:469
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.aliyun.pds.mountapp.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/mountapp.md:475
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    # launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.aliyun.pds.mountapp.plist 2>/dev/null
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/mountapp.md:477
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    # launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.aliyun.pds.mountapp.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:283
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL --max-time 10 https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/install.sh | bash
Medium and low: 7
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:30
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:45
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:58
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:71
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/mountapp.md:398
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    Create `~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.aliyun.pds.mountapp.plist`:
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass references/mountapp.md:334
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (detector / deny-list definition)
    -Argument "-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -File `"$binDir\star…ps1`"" `
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/mountapp.md:507
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable mountapp

Files scanned: 17. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 7478 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7478 tokens
  • 100Steps. 79 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (11 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 958: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 27 example trigger phrases
  • +4Structure: 21 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 79 items
  • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (15 of 15)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is meant for Alibaba PDS cloud-drive work, but its setup and sharing guidance can expose credentials or data and reaches beyond the stated PDS scope.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 17 Aug 2026