SKILLEMALL.ai

BC alibabacloud-pds-multimodal-search

Implements exact filename search, fuzzy filename search, semantic file search, and image-based image search Triggers: "PDS drive file search", "PDS image search by image"

ClawHub Agent Skills author: alibabacloud-skills-team v0.0.3 MIT-0 21 files body ≈ 1 909 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, progress reporting

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
78
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
64/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:128
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill)
    curl -fsSL --max-time 10 https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/install.sh | bash
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:30
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:45
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:58
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:71
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (documentation of a security skill)
    sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
    security skill

A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 21. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 23 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 9 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1909 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -39 of 9 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 2 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 170: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 11 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (9 of 9)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 78.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is mostly a disclosed Alibaba Cloud PDS helper, but it is labeled as search while also enabling uploads, downloads, cloud writes, analysis, local writes, persistent CLI changes, and credential-backed access.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026