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DC alibabacloud-tablestore-agent-storage

Alibaba Cloud Tablestore Agent Storage Skill. Use for building and managing Tablestore-based knowledge bases with the `tablestore-agent-storage` Python SDK. Triggers: "知识库", "tablestore", "ots", "表格存储", "agent storage", "knowledge base", "向量检索", "文档上传", "文档导入", "知识库同步", "tablestore-agent-storage", "AgentStorageClient"

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: alibabacloud-skills-team v0.0.1 MIT-0 9 files body ≈ 4 356 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
59/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
37
Quality 40%
93
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 10

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/ossutil-installation-guide.md:46
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    sudo -v ; curl https://gosspublic.alicdn.com/ossutil/install.sh | sudo bash
Medium and low: 9
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/aliyun-cli-installation-guide.md:36
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv ./aliyun /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/aliyun-cli-installation-guide.md:80
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv ./aliyun /usr/local/bin
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/ossutil-installation-guide.md:31
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv ossutil /usr/local/bin/ && sudo ln -s /usr/local/bin/ossutil /usr/bin/ossutil
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/ossutil-installation-guide.md:40
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv ossutil /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/ossutil-installation-guide.md:46
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo -v ; curl https://gosspublic.alicdn.com/ossutil/install.sh | sudo bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/ossutil-installation-guide.md:67
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv ossutil /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/ossutil-installation-guide.md:76
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv ossutil /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/tablestore-cli-installation-guide.md:35
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv ./ts /usr/local/bin/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/tablestore-cli-installation-guide.md:45
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv ./ts /usr/local/bin/

Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4356 tokens
  • 100Steps. 71 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 13 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 319: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 43 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 71 items
  • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 7)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 93.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is mostly coherent for Alibaba Cloud Tablestore knowledge-base work, but it asks for high-impact cloud and local authority without enough confirmation, containment, or secret-storage safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026