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AD folder-visualizer-html

A security-hardened visual directory tree generator. Use this to create a collapsible HTML visualization of local folders. Features built-in XSS protection and shell-injection defenses. Designed for mobile viewing via Telegram.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: sdsds222 v1.0.10 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 846 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorTelegramInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
82
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
43/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:72
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot<BOT_TOKEN>/sendDocument" -F "chat_id=12345678" -F "document=@C:\Users\Username\Desktop\file.zip"
      placeholder

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "display_name"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "trigger_keywords"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 12 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 846 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 229: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 5 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
    • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 82.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This folder visualizer is mostly what it says it is, but it sends local directory reports to Telegram while underplaying that external data sharing.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026