BB jentic
Call external APIs through Jentic — AI agent API middleware. Use whenever you need to interact with external APIs (Gmail, Google Calendar, GitHub, Stripe, Twilio, and many more). Jentic handles authentication centrally so no per-API credentials are needed in the agent. The flow is: search by intent, inspect the schema, then execute via the broker. Use this in preference to direct curl/API calls for any API in the Jentic catalog. Recommended backend: Jentic Mini (self-hosted). Hosted Jentic support coming soon — use the jentic-v1 skill for hosted for now. Includes an installation flow for first-time setup.
As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:104Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sudo sh && sudo usermod -aG docker $USER && newgrp docker
Medium and low: 1
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:104Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionscurl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sudo sh && sudo usermod -aG docker $USER && newgrp docker
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 13 mutating operations with no state check
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 85Steps. 7 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Failures and branches. 7 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2106 tokens
- low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -5TODO / placeholder text left in the skill
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 612: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 10 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 7 items
- +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.