SKILLEMALL.ai

BD agent-autonomy-kit

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ClawHub Agent Skills author: Sean Ford v1.0.0 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 130 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
56
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
43/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump templates/HEARTBEAT.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    templates/HEARTBEAT.md

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-short description under 40 chars: too little signal for triggering
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (agent-autonomy-kit) differs from the folder (ada-agent-autonomy-kit)
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 7 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 130 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 39: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 3 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 7 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 56.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is not clearly malicious, but it is built to make an agent keep working unattended, edit project coordination files, and optionally post updates externally without enough scoping or safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026