SKILLEMALL.ai

BD linkdrop-agent-cli

Create and redeem Linkdrop claim links from the command line with strict JSON output on Base, Polygon, Arbitrum, Optimism, and Avalanche.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Chris v1.0.0 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 435 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:22
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Risk: Runtime secrets include a wallet private key, a Linkdrop API key, and RPC URLs. <br>
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token linkdrop-agent.js:119
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "node linkdrop-agent.js send --amount 5 --token 0xA0…B48 --chain polygon",
    quoted

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 35 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 435 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +4Structure: 0 headings, hard to scan
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 137: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 35 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill does what it says, but it can immediately sign and broadcast real crypto transactions from a private key without a built-in confirmation step.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026