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BC temp-email

Manage temporary email addresses and messages using the chat-tempmail.com API. Use when the user wants to create disposable emails, check inbox messages, or manage webhooks.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Selenium39 v1.0.0 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 631 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

Integrationtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash(curl
      allowed-tools: Bash(curl *) Read
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:32
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s https://chat-tempmail.com/api/email/domains -H "X-API-Key: $TEMP_EMAIL_API_KEY"
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:46
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s "https://chat-tempmail.com/api/emails" -H "X-API-Key: $TEMP_EMAIL_API_KEY"
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:52
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s -X DELETE "https://chat-tempmail.com/api/emails/<emailId>" -H "X-API-Key: $TEMP_EMAIL_API_KEY"
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:57
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s "https://chat-tempmail.com/api/emails/<emailId>" -H "X-API-Key: $TEMP_EMAIL_API_KEY"
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:63
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -s "https://chat-tempmail.com/api/emails/<emailId>/<messageId>" -H "X-API-Key: $TEMP_EMAIL_API_KEY"
      vendor-host

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 6 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 631 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 173: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 6 items
    • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This temporary email skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but it needs review because it can collect an API key in chat and forward full email contents to any configured webhook URL without clear privacy warnings.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · 28 May 2026