SKILLEMALL.ai
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BB sn-image-base

Base-layer skill for the SenseNova-Skills project, providing low-level APIs for image generation, recognition (VLM), and text optimization (LLM). This skill does not preprocess inputs; it only calls backend services and returns results. This skill is not user-facing and is intended for upper-layer skills only.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: SenseNova-Skills v2026.9.11 MIT-0 29 files body ≈ 3 077 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

Base-layer skill for the SenseNova-Skills project, providing low-level APIs for image generation, recognition (VLM), and text optimization (LLM).

As a process B 72/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, running it twice, progress reporting

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
72/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/sn_image_base/utils/error_utils.py:92
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    class U1Ht…ror(U1Ht…ase):
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/sn_image_base/utils/error_utils.py:103
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    return U1Ht…ror, explanation

Files scanned: 29. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "triggers"

Process rating: all ten parameters 72/100

  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 14 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3077 tokens
  • low The response is described with custom markup (6 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 311: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 15 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill mostly matches its image/text API purpose, but it can send prompts, images, and API keys to loosely validated custom endpoints and includes unsafe transport and safety-filter bypass behavior.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 11 Sept 2026