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BC simplify-budget

Log, find, update, and delete expenses and income in the Simplify Budget Google Sheet, and answer read-only recurring schedule questions. NEVER use sessions_spawn or ACP — ONLY use the exec tool to run bash scripts. Categories are hardcoded in this skill — NEVER invent category names, ALWAYS pick from the exact list provided. Income uses name, account, source, and notes. For edits/deletes, find rows first, then mutate by transaction id. Amounts are always stored in the configured tracker currency. Just do it.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Serdar Salim v1.1.6 MIT-0 57 files · 48 scripts body ≈ 5 286 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

GeneratorGoogle SheetsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Consistency w 8
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/get_categories.sh:12
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -sf -H "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" "${URL}" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/get_token.sh:32
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -sf -X POST "${TOKEN_URI}" \
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-autorun-instruction SKILL.md:276
    Instructs the agent to auto-run a script on every session
    **Always run `find_expenses.sh` with a date filter. This is not optional.**

Files scanned: 57. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5286 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (simplify-budget) differs from the folder (simplify-budget-expense-tracker)
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5286 tokens
  • 100Steps. 165 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 25 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (6 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -248 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -37 of 21 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +3Description length 514: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 24 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 165 items
  • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is mostly a budget-sheet tool, but it includes under-scoped financial mutation paths and an unrelated local session-pruning script that users should review before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026