BC static-webhost
Deploy static web pages and apps via Caddy or Nginx (auto-detected). Use when: 通过 Caddy 或 Nginx 部署静态网页和应用(自动检测)。使用场景: (1) User asks to create a web page, demo, or static site and make it accessible / 用户要求创建网页并可访问 (2) User asks to host/deploy HTML, JS, CSS files / 用户要求托管部署静态文件 (3) User says "做个网页"、"部署一下"、"让我能访问" (4) Need to serve any static content over HTTP / 需要通过 HTTP 提供任何静态内容。 Supports both Caddy and Nginx — auto-detects which is installed and running. 同时支持 Caddy 和 Nginx,自动检测当前系统安装的 Web 服务器。 NOT for / 不适用于:dynamic backends, APIs, or reverse proxy configuration. ⚠️ **权限声明 / Privilege Requirements:** 此 skill 需要 **sudo/root 权限** 才能执行系统级操作(写入 /var/www/html、修改 Web 服务器配置、重启服务)。
As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:44Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo cp -r /etc/nginx /etc/nginx.backup.$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:47Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo cp /etc/caddy/Caddyfile /etc/caddy/Caddyfile.backup.$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:50Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo cp -r /var/www/html /var/www/html.backup.$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S)
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 17 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 815 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 682: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 17 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
- +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.