SKILLEMALL.ai

CF oref-native

Israeli Home Front Command alerts - fully OpenClaw native. No Home Assistant. No wacli. No Docker monitor. OpenClaw handles everything: WhatsApp + TTS.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: shaike1 v1.1.0 5 files · 1 script body ≈ 355 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 34/100 · Will not run — weak spots: steps, result and completion, when it triggers

ReferenceWhatsAppDockerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
60/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
56
Quality 40%
65
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
34/100
Will not run
Steps w 15
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence install.sh:95
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v oref_native; echo "$CRON_CMD") | crontab -
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:39
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    @reboot python3 /root/.openclaw/workspace/skills/oref-native/oref_native.py >> /var/log/oref_native.log 2>&1
Medium and low: 4
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key oref_native.py:24
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process install.sh:81
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup python3 "$SCRIPT_DIR/oref_native.py" >> "$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 &
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence install.sh:94
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    CRON_CMD="@reboot $ENV_EXPORTS python3 $SCRIPT_DIR/oref_native.py >> $LOG_FILE 2>&1 &"
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention install.sh:95
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v oref_native; echo "$CRON_CMD") | crontab -

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 34/100

  • 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (oref-native) differs from the folder (openclaw-skill-red-alert)
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 355 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3No numbered steps or checklist
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -217 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 151: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 65.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This alert skill has a legitimate emergency-notification purpose, but its main skill description under-discloses Docker, Home Assistant, 3CX calling, credential storage, and background persistence.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026