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DC moneysharks

Fully autonomous 24/7 Aster DEX perpetual futures trading agent. Manages the complete lifecycle — onboarding, live execution, bracket orders, trailing stop management, position monitoring, risk enforcement, journaling, and self-learning from past trades — with zero per-trade approval required once the user gives explicit consent at onboarding. Use when the user wants to set up autonomous live trading on Aster DEX, onboard API credentials, run real-money trades continuously, manage open positions, enforce hard risk limits, review trade outcomes, or inspect adaptive learning metrics. Maximises ROI and profit within strictly configured risk bounds.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: sharksdotmoney v1.0.2 MIT-0 68 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 7 741 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationInfrastructureAI and agentsPersonal productivitytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
43/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
22
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence documentation-moneysharks.md:1313
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    cp deploy.launchd.plist ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.moneysharks.scan.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence documentation-moneysharks.md:1314
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.moneysharks.scan.plist
Medium and low: 10
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc documentation-moneysharks.md:129
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export ASTER_API_KEY="your-api-key"' >> ~/.zshrc
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc documentation-moneysharks.md:130
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export ASTER_API_SECRET="your-api-secret"' >> ~/.zshrc
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege documentation-moneysharks.md:1290
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp deploy.systemd.service /etc/systemd/system/moneysharks.service
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege documentation-moneysharks.md:1291
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp deploy.systemd.timer   /etc/systemd/system/moneysharks.timer
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc install.sh:143
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "    Add to your ~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc:"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/deployment.md:42
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - Load with: `launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.moneysharks.scan.plist`
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/deployment.md:43
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - Unload with: `launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.moneysharks.scan.plist`
    detector
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/aster_readonly_client.py:20
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process documentation-moneysharks.md:1298
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable moneysharks.timer
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/deployment.md:51
    Starts a background / autostarted process (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - Enable: `systemctl enable --now moneysharks.timer`
    quoted

Files scanned: 68. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 7741 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 12 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7741 tokens
  • 100Steps. 88 steps
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -32 of 31 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 653: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 40 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 88 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (17 of 17)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
MoneySharks is openly a real-money autonomous leveraged trading skill, but its live trading authority and emergency controls are broad enough that users should review it carefully before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026