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FC video-batch-transcript

通用视频批量转录工具 - 支持 1000+ 网站（B 站、YouTube、抖音、Twitch 等），使用 yt-dlp 批量下载视频音频，GPU 加速语音转文字（faster-whisper + CUDA），自动校正专业术语，生成结构化学习笔记。支持断点续传、批量导出、多格式输出、需要登录的网站配置。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: shenghoo123-png v1.0.0 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 1 943 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceYouTubeMedia and videoInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
29/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
73
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 18

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store PUBLISH.md:90
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    --cookies-from-browser chrome
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store README.md:157
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    --cookies-from-browser chrome
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store REFACTOR_REPORT.md:61
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    --cookies-from-browser chrome
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store REFACTOR_REPORT.md:124
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    --cookies-from-browser chrome \
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:101
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    --cookies-from-browser chrome
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:243
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    --cookies-from-browser chrome
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:307
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    --cookies-from-browser chrome
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:326
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    --cookies-from-browser chrome
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:335
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    --cookies-from-browser chrome
Medium and low: 9
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store examples/usage_examples.md:16
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (test fixture / example file)
    --cookies-from-browser chrome
    fixture
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store examples/usage_examples.md:41
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (test fixture / example file)
    --cookies-from-browser chrome
    fixture
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store examples/usage_examples.md:84
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (test fixture / example file)
    --cookies-from-browser chrome
    fixture
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store examples/usage_examples.md:122
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (test fixture / example file)
    --cookies-from-browser chrome
    fixture
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store README.md:96
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation table row)
    | `--cookies-from-browser` | 浏览器 cookies (chrome/firefox/safari/edge/brave/opera) | 无 |
    table
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store README.md:181
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - 推荐使用 `--cookies-from-browser chrome` 避免 403 错误
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/batch_transcript.py:295
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    print("提示：YouTube 建议使用 --cookies-from-browser chrome 避免 403 错误")
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/batch_transcript.py:760
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    python batch_transcript.py --url "xxx" --cookies-from-browser chrome
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store examples/usage_examples.md:235
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (test fixture / example file; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    A: 使用 `--cookies-from-browser chrome` 参数。
    fixturequoted

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 22 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1943 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -212 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 151: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 40 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
  • +4Has examples (20 code blocks)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 73.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill appears to download and transcribe videos as advertised, but it needs Review because it encourages using browser cookies for logged-in and paid sites without clearly warning that those cookies can act like account credentials.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026