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DC project-trident-skill

Give your AI agent genuine continuity, identity, and resilience across every session and deployment with a four-tier persistent memory stack.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Shiva&G v2.0.1 MIT-0 12 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 5 266 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

ProcedureGitHubInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
47/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
35
Quality 40%
66
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  3. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/platform-guide.md:54
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/platform-guide.md:61
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://ollama.com/install.sh | sh
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/platform-guide.md:249
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | sh
Medium and low: 3
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/platform-guide.md:83
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.39.7/install.sh | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/platform-guide.md:224
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_22.x | bash -
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/platform-guide.md:251
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    systemctl enable docker

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5266 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "keywords"

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 23 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5266 tokens
  • 100Steps. 107 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 17 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -222 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 141: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 27 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 107 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 5)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
Project Trident is a coherent persistent-memory skill, but it can continuously store, structure, and optionally upload broad conversation and workspace data, so it needs careful review before use.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026