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AC saturnzap

Non-custodial Lightning wallet for AI agents via `sz` CLI: send/receive sats, pay invoices, auto-pay HTTP 402 (L402), manage channels and liquidity. Use when: (1) paying for API access with Lightning, (2) creating or paying BOLT11 invoices, (3) checking wallet balance or channel health, (4) managing peers and channels. NOT for: on-chain-only Bitcoin transactions, custodial Lightning services.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: LQWDTech v1.3.2 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 3 716 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 60/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationGitHubFinanceInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
89
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
60/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:61
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -LsSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lqwdtech/SaturnZap/main/install.sh | sh
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:365
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      - **Never expose the mnemonic** — the seed phrase from `sz init` must never appear in chat, logs, or tool output after initial display.
    • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets references/json-contracts.md:36
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "mnemonic": "twelve word seed phrase here ...",
      quoted

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 60/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 85Steps. 38 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3716 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 17 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 395: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 24 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 38 items
    • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    SaturnZap appears to be a legitimate Lightning wallet skill, but it gives agents real spending power and includes setup paths that can expose wallet secrets or install a persistent service.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026