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CC cybernetic-thinking

Thinking-mode skill for LLMs: installs a control-theoretic and systems-theoretic cognitive operating system distilled from two books — Tsien Hsue-shen & Song Jian's "Engineering Cybernetics" (工程控制论) and Jin Guantao's "Cybernetics and Scientific Methodology" (控制论与科学方法论). Shapes how the LLM reasons about systems, not just how it writes patch diffs. Teaches the model to identify state and possibility space, model the plant as a black-box hypothesis, demand observability and information channels, verify stability and convergence, respect bounds, decouple harm, coordinate benefits, recognize ultra-stability and bifurcations, and close the loop before declaring success. Use when designing architecture, writing complex code, refactoring coupled modules, debugging non-deterministic systems, or any task where "correct AND robust" cannot be verified by a single happy path.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Leon_Liang v0.6.0 MIT-0 26 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 2 276 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 8 d ago

Thinking-mode skill for LLMs: installs a control-theoretic and systems-theoretic cognitive operating system distilled from two books — Tsien Hsue-shen & Song…

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

ProcedureSoftware developmentAI and agentsResearchtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
89
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README_CN.md:147
      Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
      powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File init.ps1
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README.md:147
      Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
      powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File init.ps1
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:29
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…owm+5M22…iZ2+YLEM/XGVI…YjA==",
      detector

    Files scanned: 25. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (cybernetic-thinking) differs from the folder (skill-cybernetic-thinking)
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 85Steps. 18 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2276 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 875: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
    • +4Structure: 8 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (13 of 13)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a disclosed reasoning skill with an optional installer that writes the skill into agent skill directories, with no evidence of hidden data access or exfiltration.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 9 Aug 2026