DC evoclaw-evolved
(no description)
As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, execution cost
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellpermissions/permissions.py:36Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)"Bash(curl * | sh)",
code literal -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellpermissions/permissions.py:37Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)"Bash(wget * | sh)",
code literal -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegepermissions/permissions.py:321Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)print(f"Bash(sudo rm -rf /): {ctx.query('Bash(sudo rm -rf /)')}") # denycode literal
Files scanned: 46. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger - warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 12328 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 12328 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, write, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 70Failures and branches. 17 branches
- 85Steps. 126 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- -218 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 52 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 126 items
- +4Has examples (21 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (4 of 4)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.