SKILLEMALL.ai

CB simmer-wallet-setup

Self-custody wallet setup for Simmer agents. Bring your own key, import a funded Polymarket wallet, or connect an existing dashboard-registered agent to your local runtime. Skip this skill if you use a managed wallet — managed setup is a one-time dashboard flow, not an agent task.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Simmer.Markets v0.4.0 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 2 923 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 14 d ago

Self-custody wallet setup for Simmer agents.

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion

ProcedureAI and agentsData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
50
Failures and branches w 10
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:46
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://docs.openwallet.sh/install.sh | bash   # one-time OWS install

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "published"
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 12, 91, 154): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 20 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2923 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 281: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 20 items
  • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is mostly coherent for wallet setup, but it asks users to install mutable third-party code and use wallet credentials in a real-money trading workflow with some automatic trade side effects.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 16 Sept 2026