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BC simmer-x402

Make x402 payments to access paid APIs and gated content. Use when a skill needs to fetch data from x402-gated endpoints (like Kaito mindshare API, Simmer premium endpoints, or any x402 provider). Handles 402 Payment Required responses automatically using USDC on Base.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Simmer.Markets v1.0.9 MIT-0 7 files body ≈ 1 893 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:33
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      2. **Set your wallet private key**
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:192
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      - Set your wallet private key: `export EVM_PRIVATE_KEY=0x...`
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:110
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      python x402_cli.py rpc ethereum-mainnet eth_getBalance 0xd8…045 latest
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:116
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      python x402_cli.py rpc base-mainnet eth_call '{"to":"0x83…913","data":"0x70…ESS"}' latest
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token x402_cli.py:63
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "mainnet": "0x83…913",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token x402_cli.py:64
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "testnet": "0x03…F7e",
      quoted
    • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets x402_cli.py:76
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      print("Set your wallet private key: export EVM_PRIVATE_KEY=0x...")
      quoted

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 29 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1893 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (7 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 269: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 19 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 29 items
    • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill openly makes real crypto payments, but it gives agents broad automatic spending and blockchain RPC ability that users should review carefully before installing.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 28 May 2026