SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

DC openclaw-dx

Diagnose and fix openclaw gateway issues. Use when the gateway is stuck, not starting, crash-looping, or rejecting connections. Covers main and --profile vesper gateways. Runs triage, applies fixes, writes incident report to ~/clawd/inbox.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Austin S. Lin v1.9.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 8 357 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationInfrastructureData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
59/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
49
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
52/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:171
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl bootstrap gui/501 ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:233
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl bootstrap gui/501 ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist
Medium and low: 3
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:85
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition)
    grep OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist
    detector
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:86
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition)
    grep OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.vesper.plist
    detector
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:198
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    Then restart: `launchctl bootstrap gui/501 ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist`
    quoted

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 8357 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 13 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 8357 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 69 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 7 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 239: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 39 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 69 items
  • +4Has examples (33 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This looks like a legitimate OpenClaw troubleshooting skill, but it gives an agent broad local repair authority that can expose tokens and reset configuration or session state without enough safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026