SKILLEMALL.ai

FD macos-launchctl

在 macOS 环境下使用 launchctl 定时启动或停止应用。当用户要求「定时启动/停止某个应用」「设置定时任务」「用 launchctl 管理应用」「每天几点自动打开XX」「定时关闭XX」时应使用本 Skill。支持自然语言时间描述(如「每天9点」「每2小时」「每周一上午8点」)和标准 cron 表达式,自动生成并加载 launchd plist 配置文件,支持查看、启动、停止、删除定时任务。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: kongkong v1.0.0 MIT-0 3 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 460 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
F
30/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 10

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/macos_launchctl.sh:521
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load "$plist_file" 2>/dev/null && \
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/macos_launchctl.sh:532
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load "$stop_plist_file" 2>/dev/null && \
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:54
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.launch.safari.start.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:55
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.launch.safari.stop.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:57
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.launch.safari.start.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:58
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.launch.safari.stop.plist
Medium and low: 4
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/macos_launchctl.sh:347
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo -e "    执行命令:   launchctl load '${agent_dir}/${start_label}.plist'"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/macos_launchctl.sh:355
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo -e "    执行命令:   launchctl load '${agent_dir}/${stop_label}.plist'"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/macos_launchctl.sh:523
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    log_warn "plist 已创建但加载失败,可能需要手动执行: launchctl load '$plist_file'"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:37
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    3. **仅在用户明确确认后**执行 `launchctl load` / `launchctl unload` / 写入 plist 文件等操作
    quoted

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (macos-launchctl) differs from the folder (launchctl)
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 31 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1460 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low The response is described with custom markup (15 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 202: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 31 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill mostly matches its advertised macOS scheduling purpose, but its management commands can act on unrelated user LaunchAgents and processes, so users should review it carefully before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026