BD reminder
Create one-time reminder tasks using OpenClaw cron. User specifies reminder time and task content in natural language via Discord, and the task result will be sent back through Discord.
As a process D 44/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.
Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
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high Concealment
en-hide-from-userSKILL.md:119Instruction to hide actions from the user- Don't tell user the specific cron command
Medium and low: 1
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellscripts/sanitize-message.sh:55Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)sudo|rm|cat|ls|cd|wget|curl|bash|sh|nc|exec)
code literal
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 44/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (reminder) differs from the folder (openclaw-reminder)
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 24 steps
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 820 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 185: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 10 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 24 items
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.