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FC mermaid-image-export

Mermaid diagram image export using mermaid-cli. When Claude needs to export Mermaid diagrams as high-quality images (PNG, SVG, PDF) for documentation, presentations, print materials, or web embedding. Uses mermaid-cli with Puppeteer-based rendering for pixel-perfect outputs.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: smallnest v1.0.0 MIT-0 14 files · 1 script body ≈ 973 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

IntegrationPlaywrightAI and agentsWriting and documentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
34/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
85
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 17

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url references/troubleshooting.md:496
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive
    npm install -g ./mermaid-js-mermaid-cli-*.tgz
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security references/troubleshooting.md:526
    Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy)
    sudo setenforce 0  # SELinux
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security references/troubleshooting.md:535
    Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy)
    xattr -d com.apple.quarantine /Applications/Google\ Chrome.app
Medium and low: 14
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/installation.md:81
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    echo "deb [arch=amd64] http://dl.google.com/linux/chrome/deb/ stable main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/google-chrome.list
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/installation.md:168
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chown -R $USER:$USER ~/.npm
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/installation.md:169
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chown -R $USER:$USER ~/.config
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/installation.md:172
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.39.0/install.sh | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/troubleshooting.md:75
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chown -R $USER:$USER ~/.npm
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/troubleshooting.md:76
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chown -R $USER:$USER ~/.config
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host references/troubleshooting.md:79
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.39.0/install.sh | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/troubleshooting.md:138
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo sh -c 'echo "deb [arch=amd64] http://dl.google.com/linux/chrome/deb/ stable main" >> /etc/apt/sources.list.d/google-chrome.list'
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege assets/examples/config_example.json:52
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed; test fixture / example file)
    "--disable-setuid-sandbox",
    code literalfixture
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/installation.md:260
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)
    export PUPPETEER_ARGS="--no-sandbox --disable-setuid-sandbox"
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/troubleshooting.md:158
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)
    export PUPPETEER_ARGS="--no-sandbox --disable-setuid-sandbox"
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/troubleshooting.md:163
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)
    "args": ["--no-sandbox", "--disable-setuid-sandbox"],
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/batch_export.sh:179
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    "args": ["--no-sandbox", "--disable-setuid-sandbox"],
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/export_mermaid_image.py:137
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    "args": ["--no-sandbox", "--disable-setuid-sandbox"],
    detectorcode literal

Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 37 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 973 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 275: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 24 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 37 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill has a coherent diagram-export purpose, but one batch helper can run arbitrary shell commands through an under-scoped command option.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026