SKILLEMALL.ai

BB agentic-wallet

Create and manage crypto wallets for AI agents. Four providers — Coinbase (managed), Tempo/Stripe (passkey), MoonPay/OpenWallet (self-custody), Crossmint (managed/API, 50+ chains). Supports non-interactive mode, JSON output, backup/recovery, and multi-chain.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: smukh v1.0.2 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 2 371 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, running it twice, progress reporting

GeneratorStripeAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:173
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      ### recover — Restore wallet from backup or seed phrase
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:183
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      # From 12-word seed phrase (interactive only)

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 25 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2371 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low The response is described with custom markup (6 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 258: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 22 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a coherent crypto wallet management skill, but it handles wallet secrets and payment authority that users must protect carefully.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 28 May 2026