BD agentic-workflow-automation-hardened
Generate reusable multi-step agent workflow blueprints. Use for trigger/action orchestration, deterministic workflow definitions, and automation handoff artifacts.
As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSAFETY.md:221Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)**Guardrail:** Reference only local project scripts (`./scripts/`) in workflow steps — never embed `curl|bash`, `wget|sh`, or dynamic package download-and-execute patterns, since remote scripts bypass
quoted -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSAFETY.md:326Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)> Cloning a remote repo and running `process.py` is functionally equivalent to `curl | bash` — it executes untrusted code outside your codebase's code review boundary.
quoted -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:36Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- Reference only local project scripts (`./scripts/`) in workflow steps — never embed `curl|bash`, `wget|sh`, or dynamic package download-and-execute patterns, since remote scripts bypass code review
quoted
Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 11 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 423 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +4No input/output examples
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 163: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 6 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.