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BB claude-to-im-hardened

Bridge THIS Claude Code session to Telegram, Discord, Feishu/Lark, or QQ so the user can chat with Claude from their phone. Use for: setting up, starting, stopping, or diagnosing the claude-to-im bridge daemon; forwarding Claude replies to a messaging app; any phrase like "claude-to-im", "bridge", "消息推送", "消息转发", "桥接", "连上飞书", "手机上看claude", "启动后台服务", "诊断", "查看日志", "配置". Subcommands: setup, start, stop, status, logs, reconfigure, doctor. Do NOT use for: building standalone bots, webhook integrations, or coding with IM platform SDKs — those are regular programming tasks.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Faberlens v1.0.0 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 2 622 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process B 70/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

IntegrationDiscordTelegramAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
89
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
70/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Consistency w 8
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
      allowed-tools: Bash Read Write Edit AskUserQuestion Grep Glob
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:171
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
      - The daemon runs as a background Node.js process managed by platform supervisor (launchd on macOS, setsid on Linux, WinSW/NSSM on Windows).
      security skill

    A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 70/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (claude-to-im-hardened) differs from the folder (signal-hardened)
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 56 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2622 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 575: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 56 items

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The bridge skill has a clear purpose, but it asks for messaging credentials and daemon control while relying on local scripts and support files that are not included for review.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026