SKILLEMALL.ai

AC viral-reverse-engineering

Use to reverse-engineer why a piece of content went viral (or overperformed) — yours or someone else's — and extract the repeatable mechanism to apply to your own content. Run when the user says "why did this go viral," "break down this viral post/video," "reverse engineer," "what made this work," or wants to learn from viral content. Sources the observable signal first (intake, transcript, screenshots, top comments, visible stats — an agent usually can't watch a video from a link) and never fabricates what it can't see. Reads brand-profile and audience first, deconstructs the piece layer by layer, isolates the real driver, runs a replicability check, extracts the transferable principle, and applies it to the user's niche via the content skills. Mechanism, never a copy; flags non-replicable virality; visible signals only (no WoopSocial analytics). Single-POST teardown only: for the account-level competitive landscape use competitor-analysis; for riding a live trend use trend-jacking.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Social Media Skills v1.0.0 MIT-0 8 files body ≈ 1 586 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

Use to reverse-engineer why a piece of content went viral (or overperformed) — yours or someone else's — and extract the repeatable mechanism to apply to your…

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

AnalyzerMarketingMedia and videoData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
95/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 0

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 26 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1586 tokens
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • medium 10 test cases, all positive: not one "should refuse" or "should ask first"
    • low No test case covers injection arriving through data

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 998: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
    • +4Structure: 12 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This skill is a content-analysis workflow that uses user-provided social-media signals to explain why content performed well, without hidden execution or disproportionate access.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 24 Jul 2026