SKILLEMALL.ai

DC grago

(no description)

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: solsuk v1.0.1 6 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 760 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
46/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
77
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install.sh:29
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    curl -fsSL https://ollama.ai/install.sh | sh
Medium and low: 1
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc install.sh:107
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "  echo 'export PATH=\"\$PATH:${INSTALL_DIR}\"' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc"

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 15 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 760 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 9 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
Grago is transparent about its purpose, but it gives an agent broad unsandboxed shell and file access on the user's machine.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026