SKILLEMALL.ai
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Use when converting voice recordings, voice memos, or speech transcripts into structured Markdown notes, setting up recording-folder monitoring, or processing pending transcription files on macOS or Windows

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Moon1ght v1.1.0 MIT-0 24 files · 12 scripts body ≈ 3 036 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 30 h ago

Use when converting voice recordings, voice memos, or speech transcripts into structured Markdown notes, setting up recording-folder monitoring, or processing…

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorObsidianInfrastructureAI and agentsWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
49/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
29
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 13

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/macos/install.sh:103
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    if launchctl load "$PLIST_TARGET"; then
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/windows/install.ps1:64
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    Register-ScheduledTask -TaskName "reco…tch" -Action $action -Trigger $trigger -Settings $settings -Principal $principal | Out-Null
Medium and low: 11
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README.md:44
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File install.ps1
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/macos/install.sh:107
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "Try: launchctl load -w $PLIST_TARGET"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/macos/uninstall.sh:7
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    PLIST="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.…ist"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass scripts/windows/process.ps1:101
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    & powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File $using:scriptPath -InputFile $path
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass SKILL.md:121
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts\windows\setup.ps1 -Vault "$VAULT" -Sync "$SYNC" -Model "$MODEL" -IcloudWatchSubdir "$ICLOUD_SUBDIR" -AgentCli "$AGENT_CLI" [other options...]
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass SKILL.md:183
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts\windows\process.ps1 -InputFile "C:\path\to\audio.m4a"
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/common/trigger_agent.sh:147
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup codex "$PROMPT" >> /tmp/reco…log 2>&1 &
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/common/trigger_agent.sh:151
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup gemini "$PROMPT" >> /tmp/reco…log 2>&1 &
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/macos/install.sh:51
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    PLIST_TARGET="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.…ist"
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass scripts/windows/install.ps1:56
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    $action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "powershell.exe" -Argument "-WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File `"$watchScriptAbs`""
    detectorcode literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass SKILL.md:348
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    **Windows:** `powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts\windows\unin…ps1`
    quoted

Files scanned: 24. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "min_openclaw"

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 85Steps. 62 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3036 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval
  • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 206: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 25 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 62 items
  • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is a coherent recording-to-notes tool, but it also auto-installs/builds dependencies, creates background watchers, and can send transcripts to external agent CLIs that write, move, and delete local files.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 26 Jun 2026