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BD Solana Trading Terminal — SoulPass

Solana trading and DeFi skill for AI agents with hardware-secured wallet. Swap tokens on Jupiter DEX, trade meme coins with rug-pull detection, earn yield via Jupiter Lend, build automated trading bots, and send SOL/SPL tokens — all signed by Apple Secure Enclave (no .env private keys). Use when: Solana swap, Jupiter DEX trading, meme coin sniping, copy trading, whale tracking, DeFi lending/yield, crypto trading bot, agent wallet, agent-to-agent payments, or signing Solana transactions securely.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: soulpassai v1.0.0 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 3 451 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 44/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
91
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
44/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:35
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      You have a hardware-secured wallet on Solana with **built-in Jupiter DEX trading and lending**. Your signing key lives in the Apple Secure Enclave — physically impossible to extract. No seed phrase, n
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/merchant-guide.md:420
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - **USDC**: `EPjF…t1v`
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token references/merchant-guide.md:421
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - **USDT**: `Es9v…NYB`
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:366
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      --asset EPjF…t1v --fee-payer <facilitator>

    A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 44/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (Solana Trading Terminal — SoulPass) differs from the folder (soulpass)
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 30 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3451 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 18 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 500: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 23 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
    • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a real Solana wallet/trading skill, but it also gives an agent broad financial, messaging, commerce, and public memory capabilities that are not tightly scoped.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026