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CC spotify-player

Terminal Spotify playback/search via spogo (preferred) or spotify_player.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills v1.0.0 2 files body ≈ 221 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
62/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
64
Quality 40%
60
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: spotify-player (ClawHub)

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store skill-card.md:19
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    Risk: The skill directs users to import Spotify authentication cookies from Chrome, which can expose credential material if the CLI or storage location is not trusted. <br>
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:17
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    - Import cookies: `spogo auth import --browser chrome`

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 85Steps. 14 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 221 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 73: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +4Structure: 1 headings, hard to scan
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 60.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This Spotify terminal skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but it asks users to import authentication cookies from Chrome without explaining the credential risk or storage boundaries.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious