SKILLEMALL.ai

AD bitwarden

Set up and use Bitwarden CLI (bw). Use when installing the CLI, authenticating (login/unlock), or reading secrets from your vault. Supports email/password, API key, and SSO authentication methods.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: StartupBros v1.0.0 4 files body ≈ 840 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 45/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
45/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: bitwarden (ClawHub)

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/get-started.md:47
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv bw /usr/local/bin/

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 45/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (bitwarden) differs from the folder (bw-vault)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
    • 100Steps. 14 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 840 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 196: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 10 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This Bitwarden CLI skill is purpose-aligned but needs review because its examples can expose real vault secrets and keep an unlocked vault session active in a persistent shell.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026