SKILLEMALL.ai

BC openrouter-free-helper

监控 OpenRouter 免费模型的到期通知和新模型发现,自动每日检查并推送飞书通知

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Neo Shi v1.0.10 MIT-0 8 files body ≈ 1 810 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash exec

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requires"

Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 50 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1810 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 43: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -221 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 36 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 50 items
  • +4Has examples (17 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill does what it claims, but its automatic Chrome remote-debugging fallback creates enough local attack surface to require user review.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026